I've heard this idea before and even read it in Anil Seth's book, but I find it baffling. What on Earth could be special about the distinction between some salt ions and silicon, from the point of view of consciousness.
Especially, considering that we could in principle (though not yet in practice) trace the causal link between the information process in the brain and saying the words "I am conscious".
If we create mathematical models of neurons that are fine-grained enough and simulate them for several seconds, the simulation would say "I am conscious" exactly like the physical brain that's being emulated. To me it means that consciousness is computational.
>One would think that this should directly follow from physicalism
It doesnt, because the physics of the brain is not the same as the physics of silicon. Which is not to say that it is necessarily false.
I've heard this idea before and even read it in Anil Seth's book, but I find it baffling. What on Earth could be special about the distinction between some salt ions and silicon, from the point of view of consciousness.
Especially, considering that we could in principle (though not yet in practice) trace the causal link between the information process in the brain and saying the words "I am conscious".
It's not unusual for.phenomena to depend on specific physics -- you can't make a teapot out of chocolate.
Substrate independence is a special case, uncontroversially applying to.anything computational. Presumably, you are in Camp #1.
https://www.greaterwrong.com/posts/NyiFLzSrkfkDW4S7o/why-it-s-so-hard-to-talk-about-consciousness
Being able to.trace the physical.causation of a claim to be conscious supports physicalism.against dualism...not computationalism against physicalism.
If we create mathematical models of neurons that are fine-grained enough and simulate them for several seconds, the simulation would say "I am conscious" exactly like the physical brain that's being emulated. To me it means that consciousness is computational.